Suffolk Journal of Trial and Appellate Advocacy
Volume 12

Issue 1

Article 5

1-1-2007

After Crawford: Using the Confrontation Clause in Massachusetts
Courts
David A. Lowy
Suffolk University Law School

Katherine Bowles Dudich
Suffolk University Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.suffolk.edu/jtaa-suffolk
Part of the Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
12 Suffolk J. Trial & App. Advoc. 1 (2007)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Collections @ Suffolk. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Suffolk Journal of Trial and Appellate Advocacy by an authorized editor of Digital Collections @ Suffolk.
For more information, please contact dct@suffolk.edu.

AFTER CRA WFORD: USING THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE IN MASSACHUSETTS
COURTS

The Honorable DavidA. Lowy and Katherine Bowles Dudich'
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................
2
II.
APPLICABILITY OF THE CLAUSE ......................................................... 3
III.
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE: CRA WFORD AND BEYOND.. 5

A.
B.
C.

Crawford ............................................................................
5
Gonsalves ............................................................................
9
Davis...............................................................................
. . 12

IV.

ANALYSIS FOR "TESTIMONIAL" STATEMENTS UNDER US/MA LAW .... 16

V.

A.
Testimonial PerSe .............................................................
16
B.
Testimonial in Fact...........................................................
23
C.
Forfeitureby Wrongdoing.................................................
25
C ONCLUSION ..............................................
30

The Honorable David A. Lowy is an Associate Justice of the Massachusetts Superior
Court. Judge Lowy obtained a B.A. from the University of Massachusetts and J.D. from
Boston University Law School. He is an adjunct professor of law at Boston University
School of Law, Suffolk University Law School and New England School of Law. Ms.
Bowles Dudich obtained a B.A. and masters degree in nursing from the University of Akron and J.D. from the Massachusetts School of Law where she teaches Legal Research and
Writing. She previously served as a law clerk for the Justices of the Massachusetts Superior
Court and is currently assistant general counsel for the Massachusetts Board of Registration
in Medicine. The authors are grateful to Robert Stetson of Suffolk University Law School
(J.D. 2007, expected) for his hard work and dedication to the article. The authors would
also like to thank the editors of the Suffolk Journal of Trial and Appellate Advocacy for
their diligence and attentiveness during the editing process.

2

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XII

I. INTRODUCTION*
The sea change in interpretation of the Confrontation Clause that
followed the United States Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v.
Washington2 has been disconcerting to litigator and jurist alike. The Confrontation Clause, once a fleeting thought in constitutional jurisprudence,
now stands as an obstacle to admissibility separate from whether or not
evidence satisfies a hearsay exception. The source of the confusion is twofold: (1) a failure to recognize precisely that the Confrontation Clause
analysis is "distinct but symbiotic" to the hearsay analysis; 3 and (2) the
failure of appellate courts to provide a broadly applicable definition as to
when hearsay violates the Confrontation Clause. This article seeks to demystify the Confrontation Clause, with a specific focus on Massachusetts,
and provide suggestions for analyzing Confrontation Clause evidentiary
issues.
In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court held that "testimonial hearsay" is inadmissible unless the out of court declarant is both unavailable as a matter of law and was previously subject to crossexamination. 4 The Court chose, however, not to provide a functional definition of "testimonial." 5 Other courts did only marginally better. In Commonwealth v. Gonsalves,6 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
("SJC") provided a clear definition of testimonial in its own interpretation
of the Sixth Amendment.7 Following the Gonsalves decision, the United
States Supreme Court revisited the definition of testimonial in Davis v.
Washington and Hammon v. Indiana.8 While the Court's most recent hold*The editors wish to note that all citations to Massachusetts cases will consist of parallel
cites to both the state and regional reporters, out of convenience to Massachusetts practitioners.
2 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
3 See United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct.
2983 (2006).
4 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
5 Id. ("We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition").
6 445 Mass. 1, 833 N.E.2d 549 (2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 2982 (2006).
7 Id. As discussed infra, it is important for the Massachusetts litigator to recognize that
in the wake of Crawford, the SJC has yet to discuss the cognate provisions of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, which might provide an avenue for enhanced confrontation
protections for criminal defendants. But see Commonwealth v. Whelton, 428 Mass. 24, 28,
696 N.E.2d 540, 545 (1998) (explaining that Article XII provides no more protection than
the Sixth Amendment). Unless and until such time, however, it is the last word of the
United States Supreme Court, and not the SJC, that controls. While state courts may never
interpret their own state constitutions as providing less protection than the United States
Constitution, they may interpret their own cognate constitutional provisions as providing
more.
8 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006). Both Davis and Hammon where decided in one consolidated

2007]

CRA WFORD IN MASSACHUSETTS

ings leave many questions and provide few answers, the holdings narrow
down several areas of uncertainty. These cases will be discussed throughout this article.
II. APPLICABILITY OF THE CLAUSE
The Confrontation Clause9 protects the right to cross-examine hearsay declarants in certain defined circumstances.'l The role of crossexamination is to both seek the truth and to promote confidence in convictions as well as justice overall. This idea has a long history in AngloAmerican jurisprudence.
Sir Walter Raleigh, demanding the justice he would never see,
promoted confidence in the maintenance of the social compact through
ordered liberty as manifested in courts of law when he proclaimed:
If you proceed to condemn me here by bare inferences,
without an oath, without a subscription, without witnesses,
upon a paper accusation, you try me by the Spanish Inquisition. If my accuser were dead or abroad, it were something but he liveth . . .Why, then, I beseech you, my
Lords, let Cobham be sent for; let him be charged upon his
soul; upon his allegiance to the King, and if he will then
maintain1 his accusation to my face, I will confess myself
guilty."
Raleigh's plea for confrontation occurred during his famous trial
for treason, in which he was subsequently convicted and sentenced to
death. Raleigh had no opportunity to cross-examine his accuser.
Professor Wigmore referred to cross-examination as the "greatest
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.' 2 Without crossexamination, under oath, under the gaze of a jury observing the witness's
demeanor, truth may prove elusive. Thus, the danger of hearsay is that it
cannot be adequately tested by cross-examination. The infirmities of hearsay are well-known and often discussed in the law school classroom. The
opinion. As such, the two will be referred to as Davis when needed.
9 U.S. CONST. Amend. VI provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him."
1o See 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §1395 (1974) [hereinafter WIGMORE]; see also
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE §8.1 (2d ed. 1999).
11 Commonwealth v. Kartell, 20 Mass. L. Rptr. 134 n.2, No. 1999-0655, 2005 WL
2739786 (Mass. Super. Oct. 25, 2005) (citing Danielle Dupre, Note, Crawfordv. Washington: Reclaiming the OriginalMeaning of the Confrontation Clause, 21 TouRo L. REV.231,
232 n.9 (2005).
12 WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 1367.
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trial lawyer and judge would be well served to have these infirmities on
the tip of their tongue. The infirmities of an out-of-court declarant's statement, which cannot be tested at the time they are made through crossexamination are (1) misperception; (2) faulty memory; (3) misstatement or
"faulty narration"; and (4) distortion or deception. 13 The Confrontation
Clause stands as the constitutional limit by which our system of justice
challenges these infirmities.
To the extent these infirmities or frailties are mitigated by the nature of certain hearsay statements and to some extent, in conjunction with
the loss of highly probative evidence, hearsay exceptions developed at
common law. 14 Certain familiar exceptions to the rule come to mind, such
as dying declarations, spontaneous utterances, business records, present
sense impressions, then-existing physical condition, and statements made
to medical personnel. The Sixth Amendment may serve as a constitutional
limit when these hearsay exceptions are advanced to admit evidence
against a criminal defendant. With these thoughts in mind, the following
circumstances pose no Confrontation Clause impediments to admissibility.
A firm understanding of the Clause's inapplicability in these circumstances will instill confidence and hope in the Massachusetts litigator as he
attempts to understand this difficult topic. Accordingly, the Confrontation
Clause does not apply:
1. in any civil case, including sexually dangerous person pro15
ceedings;
2. anytime the out of court statement is being offered for a
purpose other than its truth; 6
3. when offered by the defendant;
4. when the declarant is available for cross-examination at
17
trial;
5. if the out-of-court declarant is unavailable as a matter of
law but was previously subject to cross-examination by the
13

See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK,

EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES, 109-10 (5th

ed. 2004)

(explaining hearsay infirmities with helpful examples). Examples of the infirmities in practice include: witness A, who stated that the car was blue when it was actually silver, misperceived the color of the car; and witness B, who stated that the car was blue when it was
actually silver, deliberately distorted the color of the car because he disliked the driver. Id.
14 Id. at 157.
15 Commonwealth v. Given, 441 Mass. 741,746 n.8, 808 N.E.2d 788, 793 n.8 (2004).
16 Commonwealth v. Brum, 438 Mass. 103, 117, 777 N.E.2d 1238, 1250 (2002) (confrontation right not offended when statement offered for nonhearsay purposes).
17 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970). Note, however, that while there may
not be a Confrontation Clause issue if the out-of-court declarant appears at trial for confrontation, the statement is still hearsay even when the out-of-court declarant is testifying
about the statement and such statement is offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Of
course, hearsay exceptions or exemptions may still apply.
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5

defendant;18 and
6. when the hearsay is not "testimonial" (whatever that
means). 19
Numbers one through four are easy to understand and require little
clarification. Number five requires a definition of "unavailability" and

"cross-examination" - - easy enough 20 - - and also an understanding of the

doctrinal goal of the Confrontation Clause as referenced briefly above. If
the declarant is unavailable and has been subject to prior crossexamination, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied and the hearsay statement is admissible. In order to understand number six, however, a definition clarifying the testimonial/nontestimonial distinction is required. Much
of the remainder of this article will be dedicated to understanding this distinction. Let us begin then by discussing the Confrontation Clause under
Ohio v. Roberts21 and the Crawford tidal wave that struck courtrooms
across the land, wreaking havoc and confusion upon lawyers and judges
alike while also fostering constitutional fairness.
III. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE: CRA WFORD
AND BEYOND

A. Crawford
During the period between Roberts and Crawford,in almost all circumstances, if the government satisfied a hearsay exception, it satisfied the
Confrontation Clause.22 In Roberts, the Court held that "when a hearsay
declarant is not available for cross examination at trial.., the statement is
admissible only if it bears adequate 'indicia of reliability' . . . [or] falls
18

Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895), accord Crawford v. Washing-

ton, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004). This exception has "been explained as arising from necessity
and has been justified on the ground that the right of cross-examination initially afforded
provides substantial compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation requirement."
See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722 (1968) (citing both Wigmore and McCormick).
19 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273 (2006).
20 Unavailability occurs when prosecutorial authorities make a "good faith"
effort to
obtain the witness' presence at trial but are unsuccessful. See Barber, 390 U.S. at 724-25.
Prior opportunity for cross-examination occurs when counsel is able to expose the witness'
testimonial infirmities under oath at some proceeding prior to trial. See Maryland v. Craig,
497 U.S. 836, 847 (1990), and cases cited.

21 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
22 See Thomas Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA L. REv. 747,

756-60 (2005); but see Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 139-40 (1999) (admission of non-

testifying accomplice confession as statement against interest violated the Confrontation
Clause).
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within a firmly rooted hearsay exception., 23 For the Court, this test was
sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause because the purpose of the
clause was the same as that of the rules of hearsay: "to augment accuracy
in the fact finding process by ensuring the defendant an effective means to
test adverse evidence. 2 4 The Roberts test, however, proved ineffectual in
protecting confrontation rights and, as a result, the Confrontation Clause
became "increasingly anemic" under its guise.
A litany of academics and judges, no doubt inspired by Sir Walter
Raleigh, denounced the state of the law. 26 Professor Margaret Berger explained that "the [Court's] insistence [in Roberts] that the sole function of
the Confrontation Clause is to promote more accurate fact-finding ignores
the historical background against which the Clause was drafted and overlooks the context in which it is placed., 27 Professor Berger insisted that the
purpose of the Clause was to monitor and deter governmental abuse and
should be refocused according to that purpose.2 8 Justice Thomas echoed
this sentiment by stating that the Roberts test was "inconsistent with the
text and history of the Clause. 29
Justice Scalia illuminated this point when he said: "The purpose of
enshrining the [Confrontation Clause] in the Constitution was to assure
that none of the many policy interests from time to time pursued by statutory law could overcome a defendant's right to face his or her accusers in
court., 30 Yet, the post-Roberts Court continued to hold that evidence law
controlled the Confrontation Clause. 3' In Roberts and its progeny, the
Court "unnecessarily ...complicated and confused the relationship be-

tween the constitutional right of confrontation and the hearsay rules of.
23
24

See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
Id. at 65-66 (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934); Dutton v.

Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86-89 (1970); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 155 (1970)).
25 See Lininger, supra note 22, at 756-60 and cases cited.
26 See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 358-59 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 865 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also Richard Friedman, Confrontation: The Searchfor Basic Principles,86
GEO. L.J. 1011, 1043 (1998); Margaret Berger, The Deconstitutionalizationof the Confrontation Clause: A Proposalfor a ProsecutorialRestraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REv. 557, 55961 (1992); Akhil Amar, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES,

125-31 (Yale Univ. Press 1997).
27 See Berger, supra note 26, at 559-61 (proposing an approach to the Confrontation
Clause that focuses on its purpose in restraining government power as opposed to promoting reliability).
28 See Berger, supra note 26, at 559-61.
29 See White, 502 U.S. at 358 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
30 See Craig,497 U.S. at 861 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
31 See Randolph Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment,
35 UCLA L. REV. 557, 622 (1988).
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evidence. 3 2
Against this backdrop, the Court attempted to disentangle the confrontation right from the rule against hearsay and re-infuse the Confrontation Clause with its original intent in Crawford v. Washington.33 The facts
of the case were as follows: The defendant Crawford stabbed to death a
man who had allegedly tried to rape his wife, Sylvia. 34 At trial, the prosecution played a statement recorded at the police station in which Sylvia
described the stabbing.35 Sylvia was unavailable to testify at trial under the
Washington state marital privilege and Michael Crawford had no prior
occasion to cross-examine her.36 Sylvia's statements were admitted over
defense objections and Crawford was subsequently convicted of assault.3 7
The question on review was whether Sylvia's 38statements were admitted in
violation of Crawford's right to confrontation.
The United States Supreme Court, in reviewing the Washington
State Supreme Court's affirmation of Crawford's conviction, began its
analysis by explaining that the purpose of the historical right to confrontation was to prevent the civil-law mode of criminal procedure abused by
justices of the peace and other prosecutorial authorities in 16th and 17th
century England. 39 The most notorious example of this abuse was Sir Walter Raleigh's trial for treason.40 In that case, Raleigh was tried solely on the
basis of out-of-court accusations made by Lord Cobham, an alleged coconspirator to the crime. 4 1 Raleigh was denied the opportunity to confront
Cobham and was subsequently convicted.4 2 One of Raleigh's trial judges
later lamented that "the justice of England has never been so degraded and
injured as by the condemnation of Sir Walter Raleigh. 43 The right to confrontation at common law, in early state constitutions, and later in the
Sixth Amendment, was borne out of this history of prosecutorial abuse.44
The Crawford court held that an absent declarant's testimonial
statements were inadmissible when offered against one accused of a crime.
Despite the lengthy historical analysis, however, even as the Court held
32 See White, 502 U.S. at 358 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judg-

ment).

" 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004).
14 Id. at 38.
35 Id.
36

Id. at 38-40.

37 Id.
38 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42.

39 Id. at 43-50.
40 Id. at
41 Id.
42 id.

44.

43 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.

44 Id. at 50.
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that testimonial statements are inadmissible at trial, the Court withheld a
precise definition of the term testimonial.45 Instead, the Court offered three
separate formulations of the term. 46 The first formulation focused on incourt testimony or its functional equivalent, such as pretrial statements that
a declarant would expect to be used for prosecutorial purposes .4 ' The second focused on formal statements traditionally used at trial. 48 The third,
and broadest formulation, focused on statements that an objectively reasonable declarant would expect to be used for trial. 49 The Court failed to
adopt any of these formulations explicitly but suggested that "[they] all
share a common nucleus and then define the Clause's coverage at various
levels of abstraction around it." 50 The Court similarly failed to opine on
what the common nucleus might be.
The only concrete insight the Court yielded was that statements
from prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, at a
former trial, or in response to police interrogation, are testimonial under
any definition.5' Police interrogations, after all, "bear a striking resemblance to examinations done by justices of the peace in England" and lie at
the heart of statements the Clause was drafted to address. 52 The Court was
reluctant to furnish a definition for the term "interrogation," however, and
only hinted that police interrogations were to be understood in a "colloquial, rather than any technical legal, sense." 3 Despite the ambiguity rife
throughout the opinion, the Court ultimately held that Sylvia's statements
45
46

Id. at 68.

Id. at 52. The exact wording of the formulations was:
'ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent--that is,
material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony
that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial
statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used
prosecutorially,' Brief for Petitioner 23; 'extrajudicial statements
...contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions,' White v. Illinois,
502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); 'statements that were
made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use
at a later trial,' Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae 3.
Id.

47

Id.

48

Crawford,541 U.S. at 52.

49 Id.
50

Id.

" Crawford,541 U.S. at 52.
52 Id.
" Crawford,541 U.S. at 53 n.4.
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were made in response to police interrogation and were therefore "testimonial. 5 4
While Crawford placed the Confrontation Clause on a firmer constitutional footing than the Roberts test, it failed to shape the contours of
the Clause with any real clarity. 55 Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a dissent-like
concurrence, chastised the Court for its indecisive opinion when he observed, "[r]ules of criminal evidence are applied everyday in courts
throughout the country, and parties should not be left in the dark in this
manner." 56 The First Circuit echoed this sentiment when it noted "the
Court left open the parameters of testimonial hearsay, and so its ruling
produced a miasma of uncertainty., 57 Trial lawyers and judges undoubtedly concurred. It was into this "miasma" that the Supreme Judicial Court
offered Commonwealth v. Gonsalves.
B. Gonsalves
In Commonwealth v. Gonsalves,58 the SJC began the process of deciphering Crawford and applying it to specific facts arising in the Commonwealth.59 In doing so, the SJC created a doctrinal dichotomy as to
what constitutes testimonial statements: "testimonial per se" and "testimonial in fact." If a statement fell into either category, it would be inadmissible under Crawford.First, the SJC held that prior testimony before a grand
jury, at a preliminary hearing, or former trial and statements procured
through "police interrogation" are all testimonial per se. The court went on
to explain that all law enforcement questioning related to the investigation
or prosecution of a crime constitutes police interrogation; therefore, any
statement made in response to such questioning is "testimonial per se."6 °
The court, however, explained that statements made in response to quesId. at 68.
55 See United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 55-56 (1st Cir. 2005) (explaining that
"Crawford ruling left a miasma of uncertainty" regarding testimonial hearsay).
56 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 75 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
5' See Brito, 427 F.3d at 55-56.
58 445 Mass. 1, 833 N.E.2d 549 (2005).
59 Commonwealth v. Foley, 445 Mass. 1001, 833 N.E.2d 130 (2005), cert. denied, 126
S. Ct. 2980 (2006) and Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 445 Mass. 1003, 833 N.E.2d 134
(2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2979 (2006), applied the SJC's holding in Gonsalves and
were issued on the same day.
60 Gonsalves, 445 Mass. at 9, 833 N.E.2d at 555-56. The Gonsalves court justified its
broad definition of police interrogation because a colloquial understanding of the term,
which was part of the Crawford interpretation, "both in the general public and the legal
community" included "investigatory interrogation - 'routine, nonaccusatory questioning by
the police of a person who is not in custody."' Gonsalves, 445 Mass. at 7-8, 833 N.E.2d at
555 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 838 (8th ed. 2004)).
14
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tions related to the government's community caretaking function were
nontestimonial. 6' The community caretaking function is implicated when
there is an objectively reasonable basis for believing that the safety of an
individual or the public is jeopardized.62 Second, the court stated that even
if an out of court statement is not testimonial per se it still may be testimonial in fact. The court explained that a statement is testimonial in fact if a
reasonable person in the declarant's position would believe that declarant's
statements might be used in the investigation or prosecution of a crime.63
Thus, in one fell swoop, the SJC divided the testimonial analysis into a
two-pronged inquiry.
The facts of Gonsalves were as follows: On March 16, 2003,
Phyllis Duffin heard yelling and screaming coming from her daughter

Kimberly's bedroom. 64 Phyllis went to Kimberly's room where Kimberly,
crying and hysterical, told her mother that her boyfriend, the defendant,
who was no longer on the premises, had grabbed her and choked her.65
Although the Duffins did not call the police, two officers from the Brockton Police Department were dispatched to the Duffin residence in response
to an emergency 911 call. 66 Upon arrival, Officer Legrice asked Kimberly
some preliminary questions about the disturbance and learned that the defendant had "grabbed her by the neck,
lifted her up off the ground, choked
67
her, and hit her head off the floor.,
Kimberly became unavailable to testify. 68 The Commonwealth
61

Gonsalves, 445 Mass. at 9, 833 N.E.2d at 556 (citing Commonwealth v. Evans, 436

Mass. 369, 372, 764 N.E.2d 841, 844 (2002)). The Gonsalves court justified this exception
by stating that law enforcement questioning made to secure a volatile scene or to provide
medical care was completely "divorced" from statements the Confrontation Clause was
directed at. Gonsalves, 445 Mass. at 8, 833 N.E.2d at 555.
62 See Gonsalves, 445 Mass. at 9-10, 833 N.E.2d at 556 (citing Commonwealth v.
Brinson, 440 Mass. 609, 800 N.E.2d 1032 (2003)); see also Commonwealth v. Murdough,
428 Mass. 760, 704 N.E.2d 1184 (1999); Commonwealth v. Leonard, 422 Mass. 504, 663
N.E.2d 828 (1996); Commonwealth v. Smigliano, 427 Mass. 490, 694 N.E.2d 341 (1998).
Justice Sosman criticized the community caretaking function distinction as arbitrary, unsupported by the history of the Clause and language in Crawford,and wholly dependent on
responses made to police questions. See Gonsalves, 445 Mass. at 23-25, 800 N.E.2d at
1033, 1037 (Sosman, J.,
concurring).
63 See Gonsalves, 445 Mass. at 12-13, 833 N.E.2d at 558-59. This approach is most
similar to, but considerably broader than, the objective analysis set out in the third definition of testimonial in Crawford. Justice Sosman characterized this approach as both "extreme" and contrary to the public policy goals of prosecuting domestic and gang violence.
See Gonsalves, 445 Mass. at 27-37, 833 N.E.2d at 565-66 (Sosman, J., concurring).
64 See Brief of Respondent-Appellant, Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 445 Mass. 1, 833
N.E.2d 549, No. SJC-09329 (2005).
65 Id.
66 Id. The officers were responding to an unidentified emergency 911 call. Id.
67 Id.
68 The reason for Kimberly's unavailability is unclear.
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sought to introduce her statements through Officer Legrice and her
mother.69 The statements were allowed at a preliminary hearing under the
spontaneous utterance exception to the rule against hearsay. 70 The defendant filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that Kimberly's statements,
though admissible under evidentiary principles, violated the Constitution
in light of Crawford.71 As a result, the trial judge vacated his prior ruling
and held that Kimberly's statements were clearly testimonial and thus inadmissible.7 2 A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court reserved and
reported the matter to the full bench.73
The SJC stated that Kimberly's statements to Officer Legrice were
made in response to police interrogation and, based on the record before
them, appeared to be testimonial per se. 74 The court explained that the defendant was no longer on the scene when the questioning took place and,
although an ambulance later arrived on the scene, there was no indication
on the record that Kimberly required any medical attention. 75 The court
then concluded that the police questioning was made for the purpose of
obtaining "information about the nature of the alleged crime and the identity of the accused in order to begin to build a criminal investigation., 76 If
Kimberly was unavailable for trial and the defendant had no prior opportunity to cross-examine her, the statements made to Officer Legrice would
be inadmissible. On the other hand, the court determined that Kimberly's
statements to her mother were neither testimonial per se nor testimonial in
fact because no reasonable person in Kimberly's position would anticipate
that her description of events would be used in investigating or prosecuting
69 See Brief of Respondent-Appellant, Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 445 Mass. 1, 833
N.E.2d 549 (S.J.C. No. 9329).
70 Id.In Massachusetts, a hearsay statement is admissible if made under the impulse of
excitement or shock and it was spontaneous to a degree that reasonably negated premeditation or possible fabrication. See HON. PAUL J. LIACOS, MARK S. BRODIN & MICHAEL
AVERY, HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE, 551 (7th ed. 1999). The principle underlying the admissibility of this exception is based on the following: "It is supposed that a
person under stress tends to speak what comes spontaneously to mind, without energy or
disposition to invent lies; his excited utterance is likely to be truthful in that sense, and so
the hearsay objection is overcome." Commonwealth v. Santiago, 437 Mass. 620, 623-24,
774 N.E.2d 143, 146 (2002) (citing Commonwealth v. Carasquillo, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 363,
368, 765 N.E.2d 777, 781 (2002) and Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 364 Mass. 211, 222,
303 N.E.2d 338, 347 (1973)).
71 See Brief of Respondent-Appellant, Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 445 Mass. 1, 833
N.E.2d 549, No. SJC-09329 (2005).
72 Gonsalves, 445 Mass. at 6, 833 N.E.2d at 554.
73 Id.
74 Gonsalves, 445 Mass. at 12, 833 N.E.2d at 558. The SJC remanded the case to the
trial court for further development of the facts.
75 id.

76 Id.

12

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XII

the defendant.77
C. Davis
The SJC's definitions of both testimonial per se and testimonial in
fact in Gonsalves represent one appellate court's interpretation in a country
where many courts have offered divergent views.7 8 The need for a firm
resolution to these key Confrontation Clause issues cannot be overstated,
especially in domestic abuse cases and gang prosecutions.7 9 In Davis v.
Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, the United States Supreme Court
77 Gonsalves, 445 Mass. at 18, 833 N.E.2d at 561. In Rodriguez, a case factually similar to Gonsalves, the court also held that statements made to on-scene police officers by a
victim of domestic abuse were testimonial. The victim had no apparent injuries, did not
require immediate medical attention, and no immediate danger was posed to her family or
the responding officers at the scene. The purpose of the elicited statements was to identify
the defendant as the perpetrator and provide a description of the past events as they had
occurred. As such, the statements were made in response to investigatory police questioning, not to enable police assistance, and were inadmissible without cross-examination. See
Rodriguez, 445 Mass. at 1003-04, 833 N.E.2d at 134-35.
By contrast to Gonsalves and Rodriguez, in Foley the police arrived on the scene of a
domestic dispute to find a house in complete "disarray." The victim was "crying" and her
four children looked "horrified." Believing they were in the midst of an emergency, the
officers asked "Where is he?" Responding to that question, one child pointed to the bedroom. The officers went to the bedroom, found the defendant, handcuffed him, and placed
him in custody. The officers then returned to the victim and her children to find out if any
of them needed medical attention. None was requested.
The Foley court held that the child's non-verbal pointing, which constituted an assertion
and was therefore a hearsay statement, in response to "Where is he" and the statements
made in response to police inquiries about medical attention were nontestimonial. First, the
court explained that the statements were not testimonial per se because the purpose of the
questioning implicated the community caretaking function rather than the investigation of
alleged criminal acts. Next, under the second prong of analysis, the court explained that the
statements were not testimonial in fact because "a reasonable person in each declarant's
position would not have anticipated that either the child's or the adult victim's statement
would be used against the accused in investigating and prosecuting the crime." These
statements were therefore admissible without confrontation. See Commonwealth v. Foley,
445 Mass. 1001, 1001-02, 833 N.E.2d 130, 132-33 (2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2980
(2006).
78 See, e.g., United States v. Brun, 416 F.3d 703, 707-08 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding
excited utterances admissible because they are inherently nontestimonial); see also United
States v. Arnold, 410 F.3d 895, 903 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding 911 calls inadmissible because
caller could anticipate the calls would be used for investigative purposes); Hammon v.
Indiana, 829 N.E.2d 444, 453 (Ind. 2005), rev'd, 125 S. Ct. 2266 (2006) (holding responses
to preliminary on the scene police questioning was not the result of police interrogation).
But see United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 55-56 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding excited statement admissible because declarant faced "imminent personal peril").
79 Richard Friedman and Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REv.
1171, 1175 (2002).
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took the opportunity to reconsider these issues, or at least the police interrogation definition (i.e., the SJC's testimonial per se prong), and provide
some clarity to the confusion that had, thus far, symbolized the postCrawfordera.
The facts of Davis were as follows: On February 1, 2001, Michelle
McCottry called 911 to report her boyfriend for violating a protection order, but hung up before saying anything. 80 The 911 operator called back
and asked McCottry what was going on. McCottry, hysterical and crying,
responded: "He's here jumpin' on me again.'' In response to more questions by the operator, McCottry explained that the perpetrator was "Adrian
Martell Davis. 82 McCottry then stated that Davis had "just run out the
door., 83 The operator asked if McCottry needed an "aid car" but she responded "No, I'm all right." The police arrived minutes after the phone
call ended and observed "fresh injuries" on McCottry's forearm and face.84
Davis, the petitioner, was charged with violation of a protection order and assault. McCottry refused to testify at trial, but her 911 calls were
admitted as spontaneous utterances, which, under the Roberts test, meant
they were also admissible under the Confrontation Clause. 85 Davis was
found guilty and his conviction was affirmed on appeal.86 After Crawford,
the Washington Supreme Court reaffirmed the conviction stating that the
911 call was nontestimonial and that "it was doubtful whether there could
exist 'any circumstances under which a statement qualifying as an excited
utterance would be testimonial."'' 87 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to decide whether McCottry's 911 call constituted
a testimonial statement
88
subject to Confrontation Clause analysis.
The Hammon facts were as follows: On the night of February 26,
2003, police responded to a "reported domestic disturbance" at the home
of Amy and Hershel Hammon. 89 Amy was on the front porch "somewhat
frightened" and Hershel was in the kitchen. 90 The officers entered the

80

Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2270-71 (2006).

81 Id.
82 Id. at 2271.

Id.
Id.
85 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2271. Brief for the Respondent indicates that McCottry was
83

84

under subpoena but failed to appear for Davis' trial and could not be located. Davis argued
that the State made no attempt to prove that McCottry was legally unavailable as a witness.
Brief for Petitioner, Washington v. Davis, No. 05-5224 at 9.
86 Id
87

Id.

88 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2271-72.

88 Id. at 2272.
90

Id.
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house and observed the living room in disarray. 91 Soon after, Amy came
back in the house and, upon prompting by the officers in a room separate
from Hershel, explained that during a verbal argument "Mr. Hammon had
pushed her onto the ground, had shoved her head into the broken glass of
the heater and that he had punched her in the chest twice." 92
Hershel, the petitioner, was charged with domestic battery and with
violating his probation. 93 Amy did not appear at trial but the State intro94
duced her statements through the officers who responded to the scene.
Over defense counsel's objections, Amy's statements were admitted as
"excited utterances." 95 Hershel was found guilty on both counts and his
conviction was affirmed on appeal. 96 The Indiana Supreme Court reaffirmed, explaining that Amy's statements were nontestimonial because
initial inquiries by a first-responding officer are not "interrogation" and
Amy's responses were not motivated by a desire to preserve evidence for
trial. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 97
In a consolidated opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Court held
9-0 that McCottry's statements in Davis were admissible but 8-1 that
Amy's statements in Hammon were inadmissible. 98 The Court explained
that statements made to police during emergency situations are nontestimonial. 99 Specifically, the Court stated that
[s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course
of police interrogation under circumstances objectively
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is
to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.
They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively
indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that
the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or
prove past events potentially relevant to later prosecution. 10 0
As such, McCottry's 911 call was nontestimonial because it was
made for the purposes of seeking help, but Amy's statements to the first
responding officers were testimonial because Amy was in no immediate
91 Id.

92 Id. at 2272-73.
93 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2272.
94 Id.
95 id.
96
97

Id. at 2273.
id.

" Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2277-78, 2280.
Id. at 2273-74.
'00 Id. at 2276.

99

20071
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danger when she made them.1 'O
Unlike the reliability focus in Roberts or the testimonial focus in
Crawford, the Davis Court shifted the focus to the emergency or nonemergency nature of the particular situation. The reason for this shift is to
identify precisely the kind of statements made to police that can be considered "testimony."' l0 2 If a court determines that the statements in question
were made during an emergency and the primary purpose of the interrogation was to enable police assistance, then any responses will be considered
nontestimonial. 10 3 If there was no emergency and the primary purpose of
the interrogation was to investigate past criminal conduct, the police interrogation would induce testimonial responses. 1°4
The Davis test is consistent with Crawford because it acknowledges that interrogation, in its colloquial sense, can occur in less formal
settings than a legal interpretation of the term allows (i.e., at the scene of a
domestic dispute).'0 5 It is also consistent with the history and purpose of
the Confrontation Clause because the Davis test recognizes that modem
police forces, though they bear a resemblance to justices of the peace in
old England, protect and serve the public in ways that the English justices
of the peace did not and, as such, are not always vehicles for testimonial
statements (i.e., 911 calls). 10 6 The Davis test appears to give the phrase
"witnesses against" its plain meaning as directed by the Sixth Amendment,
and brings us one step closer to a clear understanding of the Confrontation
Clause.
Since the Davis decision, Massachusetts courts have applied the
emergency/non-emergency distinction. In Commonwealth v. Galicia,1 7 the
SJC was asked, as in Davis, whether "a judge properly admitted in evidence statements made by a victim in the course of an emergency 911
08
telephone call and later to police officers who responded to the scene."'
The Galicia court held that Davis controlled and that, as a result, the admission of the 911 call was proper but the admission of the subsequent
police questioning was not. 10 9 Despite the latter holding, however, the SJC
affirmed the defendant's conviction because the admission of the latter
responses to police questioning was harmless beyond a reasonable
Id. at 2277, 2278.
Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274 (citing Crawford court's use of a Webster's Dictionary
from 1828).
103Id. at 2273.
'04 Id. at 2273-74.
105 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 n.4 (2004).
01
102

106

See id. at 53.

447 Mass. 737, 857 N.E.2d 463 (2006).
108 Galicia,447 Mass. at 737, 857 N.E.2d at 465.
109 Galicia,447 Mass. at 745, 857 N.E.2d at 470.

107
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doubt." 0
IV. ANALYSIS FOR "TESTIMONIAL" STATEMENTS UNDER
CURRENT UNITED STATES/MASSACHUSETTS LAW

A. Testimonial PerSe
The testimonial per se prong from Gonsalves focuses on whether a
statement was made in response to a police interrogation. Under Gonsalves, this occurred any time a declarant responded to a police question
unrelated to the community caretaking function."' In Davis, however, the
Supreme Court enunciated something a bit different:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating
that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that
there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to establish 1or
prove past
2
events potentially relevant to later prosecution.
Thus, the Davis Court considered the primary purpose of the government in eliciting statements from a declarant as dispositive of the issue.
Massachusetts courts, however, articulated a second necessary step by
determining the reasonable declarant's objective expectation of the manner
in which such statements would be used. Where Davis and Gonsalves diverge, Davis is controlling under the Sixth Amendment and should be the
focus of the testimonial per se analysis. For example, after Davis, the Gonsalves testimonial-in-fact analysis is no longer controlling on statements
involving police questioning.
The SJC's reasoning in Gonsalves may still prove useful in litigating some of the extraneous testimonial per se issues as they appear infra.
Further, because the Gonsalves decision interpreted the Sixth Amendment,
the SJC may still interpret the cognate provisions of Article 12 in accordance with the Gonsalves reasoning." 3 As such, the Massachusetts crimiHo

Galicia,447 Mass. at 739-40, 857 N.E.2d at 466.

Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 445 Mass. 1, 8-9, 833 N.E.2d 549, 555-56 (2005).
112 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2276 (2006) (emphasis added).

113 See supra note 7 (explaining SJC's authority to interpret state constitutional provi-
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nal defense bar should argue in accordance with the Gonsalves testimonial
in fact reasoning under Article 12 even as it is superseded for purposes of
the Sixth Amendment. Moreover, Massachusetts litigators should keep an
eye on the Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, always bearing in mind that, in Gonsalves, the SJC was interpreting the Sixth
Amendment.
The Davis opinion removed several ambiguities in Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence with respect to police interrogation, yet many questions still remain. For example: How is the analysis done? Is it the questions, answers, or both that indicate an emergency is ongoing? Where does
one draw the line between testimonial and nontestimonial statements?
When does a suspect's identity help resolve an emergency? Can an emergency scene move? Furthermore, what is the scope of harm that defines an
emergency? These questions and others will be litigated in the post-Davis
litigation crucible. Fortunately, the aforementioned opinions provide some
insight and perhaps even answers for those who are searching.
How, then, is the analysis done? In Davis, the Court explained that
McCottry's statements to the 911 operator described information about
1' 14
current circumstances necessary to resolve a "bona fide physical threat."
Her "frantic answers were provided over the telephone, in an environment
that was not tranquil" and the level of formality stood in stark contrast to
the calm station-house interrogation in Crawford."5 Thus, McCottry's
statements did not have any "courtroom analogues" and were not a
"weaker substitute for live testimony." ' 1 6 Importantly, however, the Court
explained that portions of McCottry's statements, such as those made after
Davis left the premises and the emergency had seemingly
subsided, could
7
be redacted or excluded during a motion in limine.l
In Hammon, on the other hand, the Court explained that the subject
of police questioning was directed toward "possibly criminal past conduct"
as opposed to the current resolution of an emergency situation. 118 When
the officers arrived on the scene, they heard no arguments between Amy
and Hershel, saw no violence or acting out by either of them and, when
asked if things were okay, Amy told the officers "that things were fine."' 19
Further, the officers' presence on the scene assured that Amy was in no
immediate danger from Hershel. 120 As a result, the Court concluded that
sions as more protective of defendants rights).
114Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2276-77.
115 Id.

116Id.
"17Id. at 2277.

l"8
Davis, 126
119 Id.
120

Id.

S. Ct. at 2278.
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the primary purpose of the police questioning was to "nail down the truth
about past criminal events" and Amy's responses were therefore testimo2
nial.' 1
The analyses in Davis and Hammon provide several points to consider for motions in limine. First, was the declarant in physical danger
while making the statements? Second, can the scene be described as frantic
or tranquil? Why? Remember, the analysis is an objective one; it is crucial
in litigation, therefore, to bring to life the circumstances as all of the actors
experienced them. Third, keep in mind that both the questions posed by the
police and the answers by the declarants are important. With that in mind,
determine whether the officer's questions were asked for purposes of sub122
duing a hostile situation, preventing injury, or providing medical care.
Determine whether the declarant's statements were made in the present
tense or the past tense. Tense might indicate whether the declarant was
seeking help or reporting a crime. Consider also whether the statements are
analogous to formal testimonial materials such as courtroom testimony,
affidavits, or depositions.
While none of these factors alone are disposi123
tive, all are helpful.
Another important question to ask is: Where does one draw the line
between testimonial and nontestimonial statements? In Gonsalves,124 the
court identified Maryland v. Buie 125 to support its use of an objective
analysis.126 The analysis in Buie, however, may also provide a useful analogy to the confrontation analysis. Buie stands for the proposition that, under the Fourth Amendment, police can do a simple protective sweep of the
premises when executing a dangerous search warrant to determine whether
their safety is in jeopardy. 127 The Court explained that, under the Fourth
Id.
Though questions can prove helpful "it is in the final analysis the declarant's statements, not the interrogator's questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate." Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274 n. 1. Without reading too much into the decision, the Court
vacated and remanded a case where the declarant spontaneously volunteered information to
police, without prompting, and the state court held the statements nontestimonial. See State
v. Forrest, 64 N.C. App. 272 (2004), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006). An issue the Court's
decision does not reach is whether, once the emergency subsides, a declarant's statements
would be testimonial or nontestimonial in the absence of questioning.
123 Professor Myrna Raeder states that she "would not be surprised if pressure emerges
121
122

to change the typical 911 script to better fit with Davis by specifically asking as the first

question whether the caller is presently in danger." Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies
and the Children Too: Crawford's Impact on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases,
71 BROOK. L. REv. 311, 346-47 (2005).
124

445 Mass. 1, 833 N.E.2d 549 (2005).

125494 U.S. 325 (1990).
126 Gonsalves, 445 Mass. at 10, 833 N.E.2d at 557 (explaining that the law enforcement

sweep in Buie was justified by the objective standard).
12 Buie, 494 U.S. at 335.
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Amendment, a protective sweep is "not a full search of the premises, but
may extend only to a cursory inspection of those spaces where a person
is necessary to dispel" the
may be found. The sweep lasts no longer than
128
danger and ensure the safety of the officers.
The same principle of necessity that limits the safety exception to
Fourth Amendment protections from unreasonable search and seizure also
limits the emergency function exception to the confrontation right under
the Sixth Amendment. 29 Just as a protective sweep may constitute justification for seizure of evidence, police questioning only produces nontestimonial responses when necessary to enable police assistance in an emergency, but no longer. 30 For example, during a hostage crisis, motive might
be essential knowledge for the police to negotiate with the perpetrator and
questions designed to elicit such knowledge might produce nontestimonial statements. The same information about motive might be testimonial in different circumstances, however, like in a domestic abuse
situation. If one is able to determine when the questioning ceases to be
necessary for police assistance, make sure that the judge limits the evidence accordingly. If the emergency has subsided but the return of the
perpetrator appears imminent or uncertain, perhaps a situation exists where
police questioning elicits hybrid responses; seemingly testimonial declarations are elicited along with non-testimonial assertions responsive to
emergency based questions. Therefore, the moment that the emergency
dissipates is critical in providing a line of demarcation for Confrontation
Clause analysis, similar to the point of seizure being critical to the constitutional justification for a seizure.
Next, when are questions of identity made for the purpose of enabling police assistance? The Davis Court observed that the 911 call operator asked about the assailant's identity "so that the dispatched officers
might know whether they would be encountering a violent felon."'' The
Court further explained that because "[o]fficers called to investigate ...
need to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation,
the threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the potential victim
...[s]uch exigencies may often mean that 'initial inquiries' produce nontestimonial statements."'132 If the statements are made during an emer128

Id.

129

See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2276 (2006). The Court explained that

one main difference between the statements in Davis and the statements in Crawfordwas
that, in Davis, "the elicited statements were necessary to resolve the present emergency."

Id.

130 See infra notes 131-134 and accompanying text.

131Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2277 (citing Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada,
542 U.S. 177 (2004)).
132 Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2279. In Hiibel itself, the Court stated:
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gency, it is likely that the identity and description of the assailant will help
resolve questions concerning immediate police assistance. 133 If, on the
other hand, no emergency exists then the police purpose of "'initial inquiries' is immaterial, even if officers claim to be assessing the situation. 134
Can an emergency scene move? The Gonsalves court seems to have
anticipated this question. The court stated:
Although not the facts before us, we acknowledge that
situations may occur in which the "volatile" scene is no
longer restricted to the scene of the original incident, such
as when law enforcement officers become aware that a
fleeing party is driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or if such a person is armed and known to be
seeking to carry out specific threats, or certainly if a hostage is involved. These situations pose immediate danger
to the safety of the community. In contrast, the volatile
scene exception to the definition of interrogation does not
encompass questioning meant to apprehend a perpetrator
35
without a more concrete concern of impending harm.1
In other words, the scene is only one factor to consider when determining whether an emergency exists. The focus is on the "concrete
harm" and if that harm can be articulated to exist away from the scene, the
analysis need not be restricted to the original scene.
Consider also the scope of harm that defines an emergency. In
Davis, the Court explained that:
[]ust as for Fifth Amendment purposes, "police officers
can and will distinguish almost instinctively between
questions necessary to secure their own safety or the
safety of the public and questions designed solely to elicit
testimonial evidence from a suspect," New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658-59 (1984), trial courts will
recognize the point at which, for Sixth Amendment pur-

Obtaining a suspect's name . . .serves important government interests.
Knowledge of the identity may inform an officer that a suspect is wanted
for another offense, or has a record of violence or mental disorder . *.
Identity may prove particularly important in cases such as this, where the
police are investigating what appears to be a domestic assault.
Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 186.
133See Head v. State, 912 A.2d 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006); see also State v. Washington, 725 N.W.2d 125 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
134 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2279; see also State v. Kirby, 908 A.2d 506 (Conn. 2006).
135Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 445 Mass. 1, 10 n.4, 833 N.E.2d 549, 556 n.4 (2005).
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poses, statements in response to interrogations become

testimonial. 136
The reference to Quarles, like the SJC's earlier reference to Buie, is
instructive because the Quarles Court illustrated an exigent circumstances
exception to the Fifth Amendment, similar to the Fourth Amendment exception in Buie. In Quarles, the officers believed that the whereabouts of
an apprehended suspect's weapon "posed [a] danger to the public
safety., 137 For example, a joint-venturer could retrieve the gun and carry
out a crime, a curious passer-by could pick it up and fire it inadvertantly,
or a child could find it.' 3 8 As such, the officers did not have to inform the
suspect of his Miranda rights before interrogating him about the missing
gun. 139 If the defendant Quarles was instead an unavailable witness and his
statements regarding the location of the gun were being challenged on
confrontation grounds, those statements might be admissible as nontestimonial under the emergency function exception.
Medical emergencies also fall within the emergency function exception to the Confrontation Clause. In Gonsalves, the court explained that
providing medical care was part of the police "caretaking function" and is
separate from investigation.140 The court cited several cases in support of
this proposition. 41 Consider the facts in Commonwealth v. Leonard, 42 for
example: the defendant was parked in her vehicle in a breakdown lane at
about one a.m. on a busy street in Boston.1 43 A trooper observed the motionless defendant and pulled alongside her vehicle.144 The trooper unsuccessfully tried to get her attention by activating his lights, by using the PA
system, and by sounding the air horn. 145 The trooper knocked on the defendant's window, got no response, and opened her door. 14 6 The defendant
woke up and became physically and verbally abusive. 47 The trooper ob-

136 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2277.

137New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657-58 (1984).
138See id
139 Id.
140 Gonsalves,445 Mass. at 9-10, 833 N.E.2d at 556-57.
141Id.The cases were as follows: Commonwealth v. Evans, 436 Mass. 369, 764 N.E.2d
841 (2002); Commonwealth v. Brinson, 440 Mass. 609, 800 N.E.2d 1032 (2003); Commonwealth v. Murdough, 428 Mass. 760, 704 N.E.2d 1184 (1999); Commonwealth v.
Leonard, 422 Mass. 504, 663 N.E.2d 828 (1996); Commonwealth v. Smigliano, 427 Mass.
490, 694 N.E.2d 342 (1998).
142 422 Mass. 504, 663 N.E.2d 828 (1996).
143Leonard,422 Mass. at 504-05, 663 N.E.2d at 829.
144Id.
145 Id.
146 Leonard, 422 Mass. at 504-05, 663 N.E.2d at 829.
147 Id.
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48
served a strong odor of alcohol from the defendant and arrested her.1
Relying on the Fourth Amendment, the District Court judge suppressed all
the evidence obtained after the trooper opened the defendant's door. 149
The SJC reversed the District Court because the trooper's opening
of the defendant's door was "a minimally intrusive response to one of the
myriad and uncategorizable events that may alert an officer that his assistance may be required."'"5 The defendant was parked on the side of a busy
road at one a.m., suggesting that she was experiencing some sort of a problem.' 51 The fact that she remained unresponsive further suggested that she
may have been ill, perhaps even dying. 152 At that point, and consistent with
the Fourth Amendment, the trooper properly opened her car door.
Finally, another case that illustrates the potential scope of harm, at
least in analogous Fourth Amendment situations, is Commonwealth v.
Murdough.'53 There, the defendant was parked in a highway rest area on a
"bright, cold, January morning." 154 Two troopers pulled into the rest area
after having observed the car there earlier. 5 5 As they approached the defendant's vehicle, the troopers noticed that the defendant's brake lights
were on and that his eyes were closed. 5 6 The troopers approached the car
and, after two or three minutes of knocking, the defendant finally woke up
and rolled down his window. 57 The defendant was incoherent, however,
and quickly fell back asleep. 158 The troopers woke him up again, asked
him to step out of the car, at which point drugs came into plain view of the
troopers. 159 The troopers arrested the defendant for possession of controlled substances and seized the marijuana and cocaine observed in the
car. 160 The District Court judge suppressed evidence of the drugs because,
he stated, the troopers merely had a "hunch" that the defendant was under
the influence and went beyond the caretaking function by looking for evidence. 161
148

id.

149 Leonard, 422 Mass. at 506, 663 N.E.2d at 829. A single justice of the SJC granted

the Commonwealth's motion for interlocutory review and referred the case to the Appeals
Court. The SJC then transferred the matter to the full bench on its own motion. Leonard,
422 Mass. at 506, 663 N.E.2d at 829.
15o Leonard,422 Mass. at 509, 663 N.E.2d at 832.
151Leonard,422 Mass. at 507-08, 663 N.E.2d at 830-3 1.
152

Id.

'5'

428 Mass 760, 704 N.E.2d 1184 (1999).

154 Murdough, 428 Mass. at 761, 704 N.E.2d at 1185.
155 Id.
156

Id.

157 Murdough, 428 Mass. at 761, 704 N.E.2d at 1185.
158 Id.
159 Murdough, 428 Mass. at 761, 704 N.E.2d at 1185.
160 Id.
161

Murdough, 428 Mass. at 762, 704 N.E.2d at 1185-86.
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The Appeals Court reversed the ruling and the SJC affirmed.162 The
SJC held that the trooper's actions were, in fact, based on the caretaking
function and, therefore, consistent with the Fourth Amendment. 163 The
SJC explained that
if the community caretaking function... means anything,
surely it allows a police officer to determine whether a
driver is in such a condition that if he resumes operation
of his vehicle, in which he is seated at a highway rest stop,
164
he will pose an extreme danger to himself and others.
For Confrontation Clause purposes, Murdough is a good example
of a situation where, as Justice Thomas warned in his Davis dissent, "the
purposes of an interrogation [can be] both to respond to the emergency
situation and to gather evidence."' 65 Here, the emergency was diffused by
gathering evidence sufficient for arrest, yet the caretaking function was
implicated.
In sum, both Davis and Gonsalves provide the framework for arguing and applying the emergency function exception to the testimonial per
se analysis. Davis and Gonsalves also highlight cases that analyze Fourth
and Fifth Amendment rights in the same objective way premised on an
"emergency" based exception. The cases cited in this section may provide
guidance for criminal litigators to apply in practice.
B. Testimonial in Fact
Recall that the SJC in Gonsalves set out two categories of "testimonial' statements for Confrontation Clause analysis. The testimonial-infact analysis comes into play whenever the statements are not made to law
66
enforcement officials and analyzed under the testimonial per se anlaysis.1
162 Murdough, 428 Mass. at 760, 704 N.E.2d at 1185.
163 Murdough, 428 Mass. at 763-64, 704 N.E.2d at 1186-87. The court also added that,

for search and seizure purposes, the United States Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights are "coextensive." Id.
164 id.

165 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2283 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
166 A related issue is how Massachusetts treats business and public records after Craw-

ford. In a pre-Gonsalves decision, the court held that business records and public records
are historical exceptions to the Confrontation Clause and that in particular, drug certifications were nontestimonial because they were nondiscretionary records of primary fact. See
Commonwealth v. Verde, 444 Mass. 279, 827 N.E.2d 701 (2005). This view has been
affirmed and expanded to prior records of conviction and toxicology reports. See Commonwealth v, Crapps, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 915, 835 N.E.2d 275 (2005), further rev. den.,
445 Mass. 1107, 838 N.E.2d 576 (2005); Commonwealth v. Lampron, 65 Mass. App. Ct.
340, 839 N.E.2d 870 (2005),further rev. den., 843 N.E.2d 638 (2006). Other jurisdictions
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We turn, therefore, to the objective expectation of a reasonable declarant
as construed by the Gonsalves court. 16 7 The question is whether a reasonable person in the declarant's position would believe that the declarant's
statements might be used in the investigation or prosecution of a crime.' 68
The court explained that the analysis must be focused on the "declarant's
intent by evaluating the specific circumstances in which the out-of-court
statement is made," rather than specifically on the declarant's familiarity
with trial procedure or its associated formalities.169 The assessment of what
a reasonable person in the declarant's position would anticipate takes into
account the "purpose for which the statement was made or procured" and
necessarily includes considering possible manipulation of circumstances
by the questioner or declarant. 7 0
For example, an analysis of the objective expectation of a child declarant may be found in Commonwealth v. DeOliveira.17 ' DeOliveira was
a child rape case in which the Court concluded that the unavailable child
witness perceived an examining physician's questions to be medical and,
"in the forthright manner of a small child, readily responded.'1 2 The Court
explained that the small child did not recognize the criminality of the defendant's acts nor did she comprehend the potential for the prosecutorial
use of her answers to the questions. 173
As a final thought, it is imperative to breathe life into the courtroom
by recreating the reality in which the statements were made. By providing
trial and appellate courts with the narrative richness of the drama, or lack
thereof, of the circumstances that existed for the persons involved, the
opportunity to persuade the court increases. A mere proffer of either the
prosecution or defense assessment of the statement is often insufficient.
have applied the fact-based objective reasonable declarant analysis to such records with
varying results. See, e.g., State v. Caulfield, 721 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 2006) (holding drug

report testimonial because it was "prepared for litigation"). But see United States v. Feliz,
467 F.3d 227 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that autopsy reports are not testimonial because as
business records, they cannot be made in anticipation of litigation and therefore cannot be
testimonial under the fact-specific Crawfordanalysis); see also State v. Craig, 853 N.E.2d
621 (Ohio 2006) (holding the same).
167 See Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 445 Mass. 1, 11-15, 833 N.E.2d 549, 558-59
(2005).
168 id.
169 Gonsalves, 445 Mass. at 15, 833 N.E.2d at 559.
170 See Gonsalves, 445 Mass. at 15 n.8, 833 N.E.2d

at 559 n.8. It is necessary to keep in
mind that the declarant's motivations and whether a reasonable person in the declarant's
position would anticipate the out-of-court statement being used for investigatory or prosecution purposes is simply not implicated when statements are made to a government official. Id.
171

447 Mass. 56, 65, 849 N.E.2d 218, 226 (2006).

172

Id.

173

Id.
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Particularly where the issue to be resolved implicates the application of the
testimonial in fact analysis, the better practice is to offer the court all of the
intensity and humanity of the circumstances possible.
174
Factors to address include, but are not limited to, the following:
1. to whom was the statement made;
2. whether the statement was made in a public or private setting;
3. the emotional temperature of the declarant and the wouldbe witness;
4. the motivation behind the out-of-court statement (i.e.,
whether it was made to stop an ongoing emergency or to
provide information related to past events);
5. fully develop the circumstances;
6. whether police were present;
7. the content of the statement at issue; and
8. whether the out-of-court statement was unsolicited or responsive to questioning.
By analyzing the facts of a particular case within these factors,
Massachusetts litigators will be able to support their argument cogently
and effectively, thereby helping the court decide the important issue at
hand.
C. Forfeiture by Wrongdoing
It is a basic tenet of our system of justice that one may not use the
courts to perpetuate and profit by one's wrongdoing. When there is evidence that a defendant has played a role in procuring the unavailability of
a percipient witness, he may forfeit his right to object to the introduction in
evidence, on both hearsay and constitutional grounds, of the out-of-court
statements of the absent witness. 175 The Crawfordcourt rejected reliability
as a guidepost for the admissibility of testimonial statements as "an amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept."' 176 As the Court began its disassociation from Roberts, it recognized an exception to the "constitutionally
prescribed method of assessing reliability. ' 77 The Court noted with approval the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing as one such exception
174 These factors were laid out in Commonwealth v. Kartell, 20 Mass. L. Rptr. 134 n. 10,
No. 1999-0655, 2005 WL 2739786 (Mass. Super. Oct. 25, 2005).
175 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2280 (2006).
176 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004).
177 Id. at 61. (Specifically, the right to confront one's accuser in a public courtroom

where the witness is subject to the rigors of cross-examination).
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which "does not purport to be an alternative means of assessing reliability. ' 17 8 Rather, the Court stated that9 the doctrine "extinguishes confronta17
tion claims" on grounds of equity.
The Court briefly revisited its approval of the forfeiture doctrine in
Davis when it remanded the Hammon case to the Indiana state court. Respondents and a number of amici maintained that the very nature of domestic violence offenses, and the difficulty of so-called victimless prosecutions, require "greater flexibility in the use of testimonial evidence." 180
In dicta, the Court explained,
This particular type of crime is notoriously susceptible to
intimidation or coercion of the victim to ensure that she
does not testify at trial. When this occurs, the Confrontation Clause gives the criminal a windfall. We may not,
however, vitiate constitutional guarantees when they have
the effect of allowing the guilty to go free. But when defendants seek to undermine the judicial process by procuring or coercing silence from witnesses and victims, the
Sixth Amendment does not require courts to acquiesce.
While defendants have no duty to assist the State in proving their guilt, they do have the duty to refrain from acting
in ways that destroy the integrity of the criminal-trial system. 181
Professor Joan Meier noted that, "[b]y expressly linking [the]
awareness [of the dark realities with which domestic violence victims and
their advocates contend everyday] to the forfeiture doctrine ... the Court
calls attention to the importance and centrality of this doctrine in domestic
violence prosecutions."1' 82 Meier argues that the Court "effectively invites
lower courts to utilize liberal burdens of proof and evidentiary standards,
specifically mentioning the preponderance of the evidence standard and
the admissibility of hearsay as common ... and appropriate standards."' 8 3
178

Id.

179 Id.
180 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2279-80.

181Id. For the Massachusetts practitioner and jurist, article 12 should be viewed "coextensively with the Sixth Amendment," even as article 12 provides broader protection for
a defendant to meet an adverse witness "face to face." Commonwealth v. Edwards, 444
Mass. 526, 830 N.E.2d 158 (2005) (citing Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 Mass. 618, 677
N.E.2d 652 (1997)); Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. 534, 524 N.E.2d 366
(1988)).
182 Joan S. Meier, Davis/Hammon, Domestic Violence, and the Supreme Court: The
Casefor Cautious Optimism, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 22, 24 (2006), available at http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol 105/meier.pdf.
183 Id.
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Indeed, the Court stated that past application of Roberts likely rendered
application of the forfeiture doctrine less necessary because prosecutors
could demonstrate reliability more readily than they could "show procurement of the witness's unavailability."' 8 4 With respect to Roberts, several commentators have noted its faintly gasping demise, tucked neatly
into the Davis decision. 185 Absent the reliability prong of Roberts, courts
must turn now to the rules of evidence in the assessment of nontestimonial
statements.
With regard to liberal burdens of proof and evidentiary standards,
the Davis Court cited Commonwealth v. Edwards186 as an example of a
state decision relying upon the forfeiture doctrine codified in Federal Rule
of Evidence 804(b)(6).' 87 When the SJC adopted its current forfeiture doctrine it explained that, "the doctrine furthers the truth-seeking function of
the adversary process, allowing fact finders access to valuable evidence no
longer available through live testimony.'' 188 The SJC also stated,
"[w]ithout question, the doctrine should apply in cases where a defendant
murders, [ ] threatens, [ ] or intimidates a witness in an effort to procure
that witness's unavailability."' 89 Furthermore, a defendant who wrongfully
procures a witness's absence not only forfeits his confrontation rights but
loses as well the opportunity to object to the admission of nontestimonial
hearsay. i90

Legal scholars and commentators support a broad application of the
doctrine, particularly in cases involving domestic violence. For instance,
Professor Friedman maintains that, "[t]he doctrine should be applied
robustly - the court should be able to find forfeiture on the basis of the
same wrongdoing that underlies the jury's finding of guilt on the mer"84 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280.
185 In Davis, the Court stated

that, "[w]e must decide, therefore, whether the Confronta-

tion Clause applies only to testimonial hearsay." James J. Duane, The Cryptographic Coroner's Report on Ohio v. Roberts, (July 2006), available at http://wwwpersonal.umich.edu/-rdfrdman/RobertsDavis.doc. James Duane explained that Justice
Scalia stated that "[tihe answer to [this] question was suggested in Crawford, even if not
explicitly held" when the Crawford court "concluded that the history and text of the Confrontation Clause reflect a focus on testimonial hearsay" and provided "[a] limitation so
clearly reflected in the text of the constitutional provision must fairly said to mark out not
merely its 'core,' but its perimeter." Id. Duane noted that prior to the Court's consideration
of whether the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial hearsay, Justice Scalia
noted, "It is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay
that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause." Duane, quoting Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273.
186 444 Mass. 526, 830 N.E.2d 158 (2005).
187 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280.
188 Edwards, 444 Mass. at 535, 830 N.E.2d at 167.
189 Edwards, 444 Mass. at 537, 830 N.E.2d at 168-69.
190 Edwards, 444 Mass. at 540, 830 N.E.2d at 170.
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its."' 9 ' Furthermore, the SJC clearly stated that, in instances of collusion,
even where an unavailable witness has decided on her own not to testify,
the defendant may forfeit his confrontation right and hearsay objections to
out-of-court testimonial statements "where the defendant has had a meaningful impact on the witness's unavailability."'' 92 Defining the contours of
forfeiture in the Commonwealth provides the bench and the bar with a
number of challenges.
First and foremost, practitioners should seek an evidentiary hearing
on the determination of forfeiture. The SJC suggests that the parties be
given the opportunity to present evidence outside of the jury's presence.
The Commonwealth bears the burden of proving to the trial judge by a fair
preponderance of the evidence: (1) the would-be witness's unavailability; 193 (2) which is due to the defendant's wrongdoing;

194

and (3) the de-

fendant had the intent to procure the witness's unavailability in order to
prevent his or her testimony at trial. 195 Thus, the introduction of documentary evidence, such as telephone records and perhaps e-mail, enables the
court to consider the circumstances fully. In the event that the witness may
have given prior testimony under oath, even if the opportunity for crossexamination was not constitutionally adequate, the transcript or recording
96
of the prior testimony must be available for the court's consideration.

191Richard D. Friedman, "We Really (Forthe Most Part)Mean It!, " 105 MICH. L. REv.
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 1, 5 (2006), availableat http://www.michiganlawreview.org/ firstim-

pressions/vol 105/friedman.pdf. In addition, Professor Friedman suggests that one of the
critical tests regarding the Supreme Court's assertion in Crawfordas to forfeiture will
involve "[w]hat, if any, procedures the Supreme Court [will require] prosecutors and trial
judges to pursue as a predicate for a conclusion of forfeiture." Id.
192 Edwards, 444 Mass. at 541, 830 N.E.2d at 171.
193 The Commonwealth must produce or demonstrate unavailability of the declarant
whose statement it seeks to introduce which includes a showing of a good faith effort to
secure the out-of-court declarant's attendance at trial. Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 385
Mass. 733, 434 N.E.2d 163 (1982).
194 The Court explained that:
The broad scope of conduct [whether criminal or not] that may give rise to
a forfeiture is consistent with the philosophy underlying the forfeiture rule
. . . "[Tihe disclosure of relevant information at a public trial is a paramount interest, and any significant interference with that interest, other
than by exercising a legal right to object at the trial itself, is a wrongful
act." ... Thus, it is the fact that a defendant's conduct interferes with the
interest in having a witness testify at a public trial that makes the defendant's conduct wrongful.
Edwards, 444 Mass. at 538, 830 N.E.2d at 168 (quoting State v. Hallum, 606
N.W.2d 351, 356 (Iowa 2000)).
195 Edwards, 444 Mass. at 540, 830 N.E.2d at 170.
196 The Commonwealth may seek to introduce evidence demonstrating forfeiture as
evidence of consciousness of guilt or the unavailable declarant's state of mind.

2007]

CRA WFORD IN MASSA CHUSETTS

The presentation of live testimony will also assist the court, bearing in
mind that the rules of evidence are not applicable except when a witness
exercises a privilege. The defense may, however, raise its objection to any
evidence offered in order to preserve its rights at trial and for appellate
review. Since the trial court will arrive at its forfeiture determination as a
preliminary question of fact upon which admissibility depends,' 97 the court
may consider the unavailable witness's out-of-court testimonial statements. 198 How, then, will the doctrine be applied when the appropriate
case arises?
Some legal commentators argue in support of the proposition that
instances of domestic violence and abuse constitute an ongoing emergency. Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer argues that the exigency perceived
by a battered woman is "distinct from that experienced by victims of other
[isolated] types of crimes."1 99 In the face of an ongoing threat, courts may
be inclined to conclude that "in most abusive relationships, [witness tampering] conduct is inexorably bound up in the violent exercise of power
that is itself criminal., 200 Thus, law enforcement intervention merely provides the victim with a temporary reprieve from immediate violence with
the promise of future violence lying beneath the surface.20 1
Consider also the "challenge [ ] to establish new junctures for
cross-examination so that courts can enforce the Confrontation Clause
without excluding evidence. These new junctures would be particularly
useful if they fell between the time of the victim's initial statement to police and the time of trial. 20 2 Thus, there is the opportunity for persuasive
argument urging greater pre-trial opportunity for cross-examination in
domestic violence and similar cases where victims become increasingly
reluctant to continue as time passes. 20 3 The equitable doctrine of forfeiture
by wrongdoing is ripe for challenge based on the confrontation right, the
burden of proof, and the risk of undue prejudice in criminal cases. Since
Crawford was decided in 2004, the United States Supreme Court and our
SJC have invited further exploration of the forfeiture doctrine and its fact
specific inquiry.
197See Commonwealth v. Rosenthal, 432 Mass. 124, 127 n.4, 732 N.E.2d 278, 281 n.4
(2000) (Judge must be satisfied, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the wrongful (not
necessarily criminal) act occurred and that the defendant was the actor; jury then evaluates
the evidence as to weight and credit).
'9'Edwards, 444 Mass. at 545, 830 N.E.2d at 174.
199 Deborah Tuerkheimer, Crawford's Triangle: Domestic Violence and the Right of
Confrontation,85 N.C. L. REv. 1, 9 (2006).
20 Id. at 11.
201 Id. at 23.
202 Thomas Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REv. 747, 784

(2005).

203 id.
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V. CONCLUSION
2
While a trial is a search for truth - truth, at least, in a certain way 04
- it is also part of a quest for justice. The aim of a criminal trial is therefore
twofold: "that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer." 20 5 But these aims
often conflict with each other. On the one hand, it is important to convict
those guilty of committing crimes in order to promote public safety and
impose a punishment that fits the crime, thus preserving the social compact. On the other hand, our Constitution, which contains certain requirements for fairness toward defendants during trial, was written to promote
liberty and ensure that liberty is never taken erroneously. In a criminal
trial, however, liberty and justice may, at times, appear on opposite sides
of an argument.
In order to balance these apparently countervailing interests, one
must first recognize, at least in the macro sense, that these interests are not
necessarily inconsistent with each other. Criminal convictions must be
achieved in a manner in which society can trust the result. When society
trusts the result, the social compact remains intact and justice has been
done. Second - and here is a major point underlying this discussion - one
must look to the founding fathers of this great nation who, in the Constitution, did the balancing for us. As such, when the police or their agents obtain hearsay primarily for the purposes of convicting a criminal defendant,
that evidence needs to be constitutionally tested through crossexamination. If the hearsay is not obtained for those purposes or, in cases
where the police are not implicated, the "objectively reasonable declarant"
could not expect the statements to be used for investigation or prosecution,
the evidence should be available for the government to help convict the
guilty and protect the safety of the public. This is what both liberty and
justice require. After all, a trial is not only a search for the truth, but a
search for justice.

204 Chief Justice Burger wrote of criminal trials: "The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within
the framework of the rules of evidence." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
205 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).

